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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 
 
The Revere America Foundation is an advocacy organization 
dedicated to advancing common sense public policies rooted in America’s 
traditions of individual freedom and free markets.  Revere America supports 
reform of our health care system through measures that are compatible with 
these values, including improving access to medical care, providing 
incentives for innovation and encouraging competition.  Revere America 
opposes stripping Americans of the freedom to make their own individual 
decisions about medical care by forcing people to purchase health insurance 
or to incur a government penalty.    
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 
Whether Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce includes 
the power to compel individuals to enter into commerce, and buy products 
they do not want, so that the federal government may regulate them. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 This case presents the Court with a rare instance in which it must face 
its “responsibility to confront the great questions of the proper federal 
                                              
1 The parties have consented to the filing of this brief.  No counsel for 
any party authored this brief in whole or in part, nor did any person or entity, 
other than amicus and its counsel, make a monetary contribution to the 
preparation and submission of this brief.  See Fed. R. App. P. 29.   
 1
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balance in terms of lasting consequences for the constitutional design.”  
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1639 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  At issue is whether Congress has authority under 
the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact, for the 
first time in American history, a law compelling individual Americans to 
purchase a consumer product that they do not want.  Section 1501 of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act contains an individual mandate 
(“Individual Mandate”) that seeks to compel most people to purchase health 
insurance policies.  See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(b), § 10106, 124 Stat. 
119, 244, 907 (2010). 
 Although modern jurisprudence has gradually eliminated the 
distinction between interstate and intrastate commerce, the Supreme Court 
has never doubted its “duty to recognize meaningful limits on the commerce 
power of Congress,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580, 115 S. Ct. at 1640. (Kennedy, 
J., concurring), lest the limited powers enumerated in Article I become the 
general federal police power that the Framers deliberately withheld.  The 
Individual Mandate is triggered not by any activity, but rather by an 
individual’s decision not to engage in economic activity.  It regulates 
inactivity, conscripting unwilling individuals into the market to buy an 
unwanted product.  The Individual Mandate thus introduces compulsory 
 2
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commerce into the American economy – commerce that Congress not only 
regulates, but creates.  If Congress has power to regulate inactivity in this 
fashion, then one is “hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that 
Congress is without power to regulate.”  Id. at 564, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 
(emphasis added).  Such sweeping regulatory power ousts the States of their 
reserved governmental powers and thereby violates the Tenth Amendment. 
But the Individual Mandate commits a constitutional offense that is 
graver still, because it operates directly on individuals and thereby infringes 
the retained constitutional rights of the people – rights protected by the 
Ninth Amendment.  Although it is difficult to posit what Congress could not 
do with the power it claims here, it is not hard to envision what it could do.  
Indeed, Congress’ own budget office, concerned that federally mandated 
private expenditures ought to be included in the federal budget, understood 
that implementation of such a power could lead to, “[i]n the extreme, a 
command economy, in which the President and the Congress dictated how 
much each individual and family spent on all goods and services. . . .” 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE MEMORANDUM: Budgetary Treatment of 
an Individual Mandate to Buy Health Insurance 9 (1994) (“CBO 
MEMORANDUM”).  Our Constitution grants Congress no such power. 
 3
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/13/2011     Page: 9 of 40
   ARGUMENT 
CONGRESS HAS NO POWER TO COMPEL AN UNWILLING 
INDIVIDUAL TO ENTER THE STREAM OF COMMERCE  
TO PURCHASE AN UNWANTED PRODUCT.   
 
I. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS WHOLLY UNPRECEDENTED.  
 
The Individual Mandate regulates neither the “channels of interstate 
commerce” nor “instrumentalities[,] … persons or things in interstate 
commerce,” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16-17, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205 
(2005), and the Government does not contend otherwise.  Therefore the 
Mandate lies beyond Congress’ Commerce Clause power and can be 
sustained, if at all, only as an exercise of power under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to “regulate purely local activities that are part of an 
economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.” Id. at 17, 125 S. Ct. at 2205.  
The Government, accordingly, defends the Individual Mandate not on 
its own terms, but as necessary to ensure the effectiveness of Congress’ 
other reforms of the health insurance market:  extending coverage to those 
with preexisting medical conditions and preventing premiums based on 
individual medical history.  Unless everyone is required by law to purchase 
health insurance (or to pay a penalty), the revenue base will be insufficient 
to underwrite the costs of insuring individuals presently deemed high risk or 
 4
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uninsurable.  Therefore, the Government reasons, insofar as Congress has 
power under the Commerce Clause to reform the interstate health insurance 
market, it also possesses, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, power to 
make that regulation effective by creating commerce where none exists – 
that is, to force unwilling individuals to enter the health-insurance market to 
buy a product they do not want.     
An individual’s decision not to buy health insurance is not activity 
that Congress may regulate by imposition of the Individual Mandate.  It is, 
instead, a decision to refrain from activity, to remain outside the stream of 
commerce by choosing not to purchase health insurance.  The Government 
dismisses as “formalistic” the distinction between (i) regulating commerce 
that economic actors choose to engage in and (ii) dragging into the 
marketplace unwilling consumers who prefer to remain inactive and forcing 
them to purchase a product that they do not want.  Govt. Brief at 20, 38.   
The Government reassures us that this sort of congressional legislation is 
nothing new, but merely “a quintessential exercise of the commerce power.”  
Govt. Brief 16.  
But this supposedly “quintessential” exercise of commerce power is, 
in fact, without precedent in the nation’s history.  “Never before has 
Congress required that everyone buy a product from a private company 
 5
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(essentially for life) just for being alive and residing in the United States.” 
Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services, 2011 WL 285683 
(N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) at *20.  “Neither the Supreme Court nor any 
federal circuit court of appeals has extended Commerce Clause powers to 
compel an individual to involuntarily enter the stream of commerce by 
purchasing a commodity in the private market.” Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 
F.Supp.2d 768, 782 (E.D.Va. 2010).  
Indeed, even the courts that have upheld the Individual Mandate have 
conceded that the Supreme Court has never sustained congressional power 
to regulate such inactivity.  See, e.g., Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 
720 F. Supp.2d 882, 893 (E.D. Mich. 2010).  This should come as no 
surprise.  When legislation imposing an Individual Mandate was first 
considered by Congress 17 years ago, the Congressional Budget Office 
concluded that “[a] mandate requiring all individuals to purchase health 
insurance would be an unprecedented form of federal action. The 
government has never required people to buy any good or service as a 
condition of lawful residence in the United States.” CBO MEMORANDUM at 
1.  See also Florida v. Department of HHS, 2011 WL 285683 at *20. 
To be sure, the fact that legislation is unprecedented does not by itself 
render it unconstitutional; all federal legislation comes with a “presumption 
 6
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of constitutionality.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607, 120 S. 
Ct. 1740, 1748 (2000).  However, the Supreme Court has explained that this 
presumption is weakened and that an “absence of power” may be inferred 
where, as here, “earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive 
power.” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905, 908, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 
2371 (1997).  The power to fix perceived market distortions by mandating 
that consumers buy this or that product is stunningly versatile and infinitely 
applicable, and therefore the “ ‘the utter lack of statutes imposing 
obligations [like the Individual Mandate] (notwithstanding the attractiveness 
of that course to Congress), suggests an assumed absence of such power.’ ” 
Florida v. Department of HHS, 2011 WL 285683 at *20 (quoting Printz, 
521 U.S. at 907-08, 117 S. Ct. at 2365) (original emphasis by the Supreme 
Court in Printz).  
 
II. NONE OF THE SUPREME COURT’S COMMERCE CLAUSE 
DECISIONS AUTHORIZES REGULATION OF INACTIVITY BY 
COMPELLING UNWILLING INDIVIDUALS TO PURCHASE 
PRODUCTS THEY DO NOT WANT.  
 
Despite the inability of Congress itself to identify any precedent for 
the Individual Mandate, the Government now purports to find support for it 
in the Supreme Court’s decisions in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S. 
Ct. 82 (1942), and Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).  
 7
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But those cases involved federal regulation of individuals who voluntarily 
engaged in economic activity and thereby accepted the congressional 
regulation that accompanied their activity. 
Wickard v. Filburn upheld a federal price-support program that 
penalized a participating farmer for growing more than his statutory 
allotment of wheat, even though he used it solely for his own family and 
livestock.  The Court reasoned that Congress could rationally conclude that a 
decision by many farmers to grow their own wheat, rather than entering the 
marketplace to buy it, could in the aggregate affect prices and undermine the 
federal price-support program.  By the reasoning of the Government here, an 
individual’s “preference” for paying for her health-care needs out of pocket 
rather than by purchasing insurance is much like the preference of farmer 
Filburn for fulfilling his need for wheat by growing his own rather than by 
purchasing it.  But the congressional scheme at issue in Wickard imposed a 
penalty not on farmer Filburn’s mere passive “preference,” but on his 
affirmative activity of actually producing grain.  Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-
29, 63 S. Ct. at 90-91.  Moreover, Filburn chose to participate in the federal 
price-support program and, in return for agreeing to abide by its production 
limits, he was guaranteed a price for the wheat that he did choose to sell that 
was nearly three times what the market price would otherwise have been.  
 8
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Id. at 126, 130, 133, 62 S. Ct. at 89-93.  “Thus the penalty” imposed on the 
plaintiff in Wickard v. Filburn “was contingent upon an act,” id. at 133, 63 
S. Ct. at 93 (emphasis added), whereas the penalty imposed in this case is 
contingent upon inactivity – the individual decision not to participate in the 
federal government’s program to promote health insurance and the decision 
not to buy such health insurance.   
Even putting to one side that stark difference in individual choice, a 
farmer’s production of wheat or any other commodity fits easily within the 
Supreme Court’s definition of “activities” that “are quintessentially 
economic. ‘Economics’ refers to ‘the production, distribution, and 
consumption of commodities.’ ” Raich, 545 U.S. at 25, 125 S. Ct. at 2211.  
See also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556, 559-60, 115 S. Ct. at 1628, 1630 
(describing Wickard as involving “intrastate economic activity” in the form 
of “production and consumption of homegrown wheat”).  The regulation at 
issue in Wickard, unlike the Individual Mandate, did not command farmer 
Filburn to grow wheat, nor did it compel him, or anyone else, to buy it.  
Rather, Congress subjected Filburn to federal regulation only if, and when, 
he voluntarily participated in the federal price-support program and engaged 
in the activity of producing wheat. 
 9
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The Government points to the problem of “free riders” – those who do 
not buy health insurance but then demand free treatment in hospital 
emergency rooms when they get sick, thereby shifting the cost of their care 
to the hospital, the government, or other insured parties (in the form of 
higher premiums), since hospitals that participate in Medicare are forbidden 
from refusing medical treatment on the basis of ability to pay.  Govt. Brief at 
26-27, 35-37.  But that problem is of Congress’ own creation, and Congress 
cannot bootstrap itself into powers not enumerated by the Constitution 
simply because it deems the exercise of those powers expedient in light of 
other regulations that it has previously enacted.  A federal program, for 
example, requiring federally subsidized grocers to provide free bread to 
those who cannot afford it would not authorize a federal regulation 
compelling Filburn and other farmers to grow wheat to ensure a low-cost 
supply.  The quandary of what to do about people who are truly 
experiencing a medical emergency and who show up at a hospital ER 
without health insurance is undoubtedly significant – but that poignancy 
does not negate the limits on federal authority written into the Constitution. 
Congress can, by constitutional means, avoid the harshness of turning 
away from emergency rooms those uninsured persons who are truly in peril.  
For example, Congress could – precisely as it has in the Affordable Care Act 
 10
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– subsidize in advance the purchase of health insurance by those who cannot 
otherwise afford such insurance but who wish to buy it.  If some individuals, 
despite the available public subsidy, nevertheless refuse insurance and prefer 
to take their chances, they have engaged in no activity subjecting them to 
federal commerce jurisdiction until they arrive in the ER demanding free 
services – at which point their transactions with the hospital can be subjected 
to congressional regulation.  There is nothing either exceptional nor cruel in 
this arrangement:  individuals who decline to purchase fire, flood or 
disability insurance are not entitled to be made whole from the public fisc 
when their gambles turn out badly and calamity comes their way, nor does 
the Commerce Clause grant Congress power to compel them to buy 
insurance that, in their wisdom or folly, they do not want.  Thus, contrary to 
the Government’s repeated (and rather disingenuous) intimations, the 
Individual Mandate is not the only moral alternative available to Congress. 
Govt. Brief at 10-11, 19-20, 35-36, 40.  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Raich is equally 
inapposite.  The legislation upheld there did not mandate that individuals 
engage in economic activity nor did it otherwise regulate their inactivity – 
rather, as the Government concedes, it regulated a “ ‘class of activity.’ ”  
Govt. Brief at 28 (quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 18, 125 S. Ct. at 2206).  
 11
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Marijuana growers, like wheat farmers, are voluntarily engaging in a classic 
form of economic activity – the production of an agricultural commodity.  
Thus, in both Wickard and Raich, “the activity under review was the product 
of a self-directed affirmative move to cultivate and consume wheat or 
marijuana. This self-initiated change of position voluntarily placed the 
subject within the stream of commerce.  Absent that step, governmental 
regulation could have been avoided.”  Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F.Supp.2d 
768 (E.D.Va. 2010).   
III. NONE OF THE GOVERNMENT’S OTHER SUPPOSED 
PRECEDENTS REGULATED INACTIVITY BY COMPELLING 
INDIVIDUALS TO PURCHASE PRODUCTS THEY DO NOT 
WANT. 
 
In its quest for any precedent that would even obliquely support 
congressional power to compel individuals to buy products they do not want, 
the Government went to bizarre lengths in the court below.  As that court 
observed, “[t]he mere fact that the defendants have tried to analogize the 
individual mandate to things like jury service, participation in the census, 
eminent domain proceedings, forced exchange of gold bullion for paper 
currency under the Gold Clause Cases, and required service in a ‘posse’ 
under the Judiciary Act of 1789 (all of which are obviously distinguishable) 
only underscores and highlights its unprecedented nature.” Florida v. 
Department of HHS, 2011 WL 285683 at *20.  The Government apparently 
 12
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now agrees that these analogies were indeed far-fetched, for it has dropped 
all of them on appeal and instead offers a new batch of unpersuasive 
precedents for congressional power to regulate inactivity and compel 
involuntary market transactions by unwilling consumers. 
The only holdover from the arguments the Government offered below 
is the federal statute making gold bullion a form of contraband and requiring 
its surrender to the Treasury in exchange for official U.S. currency.  Govt. 
Brief at 44 (citing Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 328 (1935), 55 S. 
Ct. 428, 431 (1935)).  But that law was an exercise of congressional power 
to establish currency and coin money for the United States under clauses 2 
and 5 of section 8 of Article I, and it therefore says nothing about the power 
to impose mandates under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.  In any event, the statute in Nortz was plainly regulating the 
instrumentalities of commerce and commercial activity – the possession and 
use of gold as money – and nobody in that case argued otherwise. 
The Government also invokes other, equally inapposite contraband 
cases that provide no precedent for imposing an affirmative mandate on 
those who engage in no regulated activity.  The Endangered Species Act 
makes it illegal to “take,” “possess,” or “sell” an endangered species, which 
are all activities, and such restrictions on them are a “commonly utilized[] 
 13
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means of regulating commerce,” as the Government’s own authority attests;  
nobody in that case argued otherwise.  See Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers 
Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250, 1272 (11th Cir. 2007).  Govt. Brief at 
42, 44.   
Similarly, the Government argues that congressional power to 
criminalize the voluntary acquisition or possession of child pornography 
somehow provides a precedent for congressional power to mandate the 
involuntary acquisition and possession of health insurance.  Govt. Brief 41-
42, 44 (discussing United States v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 
2006), and 18 U.S.C. § 2252).  Yet in Maxwell nobody disputed that a 
person voluntarily subjects himself to congressional regulation if he chooses 
to engage in the “activities” of  “receipt, distribution, sale, production [and] 
possession” of “child pornography.”  446 F.3d at 1215-17.  This analogy is 
just as absurd – and, quite frankly, just as offensive – as the Government’s 
argument below that a law-abiding citizen’s decision not to buy health 
insurance is a heinous form of inactivity subject to congressional regulation 
and penalty under the Commerce Clause, just like the refusal of a convicted 
child molester to register as a sex offender.  See Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 13, 30 (discussing the Sex 
Offender Registration Act)(“Govt. Summ. Judg. Mem.”).    
 14
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These statutory regimes all involved congressional regulation of 
commercial transactions and other activities with respect to various forms of 
contraband; how the Government thinks them relevant is baffling.  None of 
these is remotely a precedent for imposing a lifelong affirmative mandate to 
enter the marketplace to buy a product or service that one does not want.2 
Finally, nothing in the various exercises of congressional authority 
cited by the Government “would bid fair to convert congressional authority 
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by 
the States.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.  The Government’s 
ambitious and unbounded vision of the Commerce and the Necessary and 
Proper Clauses, in contrast, would effectively free the federal government of 
                                              
2 The Government also seeks refuge in Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11th 
Cir. 1995), which upheld congressional authority to prohibit the obstruction 
of access to clinics and thereby interfere with those who wished to enter the 
clinics to engage in commercial activity. Govt. Brief at 44.  Although the 
protestors engaging in the obstructive activity were not engaging in 
commerce, the clinics and their customers certainly were, and in any event 
there was no suggestion that Congress was trying to regulate inactivity or to 
compel unwanted entry into a marketplace.   
 Finally, the Government cites the Second Militia Act of 1792 and its 
requirement that members of the militia obtain appropriate firearms.  Govt. 
Brief at 44.  This statute was an exercise not of the Commerce Clause 
power, but of congressional power under Article I, § 8, cls. 12-16 to raise, 
organize, regulate, arm and discipline the army and the militia.  The 
Government fails to explain how this provides a precedent for regulating the 
inactivity of ordinary legal residents under the Commerce Clause and 
mandating that they purchase a product they do not want.    
 15
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any meaningful limits on the scope of its commerce power, as we 
demonstrate below.   
IV. THE GOVERNMENT PROFFERS NO GENUINE LIMITING 
PRINCIPLE TO CONTAIN A COMMERCE CLAUSE POWER 
THAT IS NOT TETHERED TO ANY ACTIVITY, LET 
ALONE TO ECONOMIC ACTIVITY.  
 
 
In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down a federal gun-possession 
statute because the Government’s “hip bone connected to the thigh bone” 
theory explaining why gun possession near schools affects interstate 
commerce had no limit:  the Government could not identify a single activity 
that did not, under its theory, affect interstate commerce.  Nor could the 
Court:  “[I]f we were to accept the Government’s arguments, we are hard 
pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power 
to regulate.”  514 U.S. at 564, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.  Upholding this claim of 
congressional power would thus negate the central premise of federalism:  
that the Constitution’s enumeration of congressional powers “ ‘presupposes 
something not enumerated.’ ”  Id. at 566, 115 S. Ct. at 1633.   
The Individual Mandate presents the same problem, and the 
Government’s only answer is that the health care market is “unique.”  Govt. 
Brief at 7-9, 20, 34, 37.  It argues that upholding the Individual Mandate will 
not open the floodgates to similar congressional mandates in other markets 
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because the supposedly distinctive characteristics of the health care market – 
a combination of universal need, unavoidable uncertainty, and the associated 
cost-shifting – make it unique.  Govt. Brief at 34.   The court below rejected 
this rationale, and rightly so, because this supposed limit on individual 
mandates fails both as a matter of principle and as a matter of fact.   
As a matter of legal principle, Congress’ power to regulate activity 
under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses is not, and cannot 
be, conditioned on the “uniqueness” of the market at issue.  Although the 
supposedly “distinctive characteristics” of the health care market, even if 
true, might provide policy reasons why Congress would choose not to enact 
individual mandates in other areas, they certainly are not constitutional 
reasons why Congress could not.  Only the latter can provide a judicially 
enforceable principle to cabin Congress’ exercise of its commerce power.   
The Government’s blithe assurance that a decision expanding invasive 
regulatory power to unprecedented lengths will be like “a restricted railroad 
ticket, ‘good for this day and train only,’ ” County of Washington v. 
Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 183, 101 S. Ct. 2242, 2255 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting), is fanciful at best.  As the court below noted, the Government 
already tried – and lost – this same “uniqueness” argument before the 
Supreme Court in Lopez itself.  Florida v. Department of HHS, 2011 WL 
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285683 at *25.  In Lopez the dissenting Justices likewise urged that 
congressional regulation of gun possession near schools was a “rare case,” 
due to the “particularly acute threat” to commerce posed by firearms and the 
“special way in which guns and education are incompatible.”  514 U.S. at 
624, 115 S. Ct. at 1661-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).   The Lopez Court rightly 
rejected this supposed limiting principle as “devoid of substance.”  Id. at 
564-65, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.  
The Government’s “uniqueness” argument also fails as a matter of 
fact – the markets for health insurance and health care are simply not unique 
in the ways the Government supposes.  Let us start with other insurance 
markets.   Remarkably, the Government itself concedes that “[i]t is hardly 
novel for the government to require the purchase of insurance.” Govt. Brief 
34.  Indeed, in the court below the Government argued that federal laws 
mandating the purchase of insurance are commonplace, which supposedly 
makes it well-settled that Congress may “require private parties to enter into 
insurance contracts where the failure to do so would impose costs on other 
market participants.” Govt. Summ. Judg. Mem. at 30 & n. 9 (citing nine 
statutes).  But every statute cited by the Government applies to particular 
economic acts or endeavors, and requires any “owner” or “operator” of such 
property – ranging from railroads to coal mines – to buy particular types of 
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insurance covering risks attendant to such an activity.  See id.  In each case, 
the owner or operator entered the marketplace voluntarily and chose to buy 
or operate that property, and likewise remained free to avoid the insurance 
obligation by quitting the enterprise.  Such laws do not regulate inactivity 
and they therefore provide no support for the Individual Mandate here.  
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the Government itself believes there are 
many insurance markets in which Congress may be eager to impose 
individual mandates, just as it has here.     
Nor would the Government’s rationale stop at mandates affecting  
insurance markets.  Food, shelter, clothing, transportation, education, and 
communication are all basic necessities of modern life, and everyone must 
eventually participate in some way in the markets for these goods and 
services.  The Government offers no constitutional principle that would 
prevent Congress from choosing to regulate these markets with individual 
mandates – it merely offers bland assurances that Congress would probably 
not choose to do so as a matter of policy.  But under the Government’s 
rationale, Congress would be empowered to regulate grain prices not only by 
penalizing wheat production in excess of the government’s quota, as it did in 
Wickard, but by penalizing individuals who decide not to enter the market as 
consumers of bread and other grain products. See Florida v. Department of 
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HHS, 2011 WL 285683 at *24.  Or the need to prop up the domestic auto 
industry, now owned in large part by the federal government, might lead 
Congress to impose a tax penalty on those who do not buy American cars.  
See id. Although the Government now dismisses this hypothetical 
automobile mandate as silly, Govt. Brief at 36-37, during oral argument in 
the court below the Government essentially conceded the point. See Florida 
v. Department of HHS, 2011 WL 285683 at *24.  Moreover, even the district 
court’s hypothetical that Congress could mandate that everyone buy more 
broccoli – in order to support farm-produce prices, promote more healthful 
diets, and decrease health-care costs, id. – has been embraced by some of the 
Individual Mandate’s defenders.  During recent Senate hearings, Harvard 
Professor Charles Fried, the former Solicitor General under President 
Ronald Reagan, testified – while defending the constitutionality of the 
Mandate – that “Congress could, indeed, mandate that everyone buy 
broccoli.” See Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services, 2011 
WL 723117 (N.D. Fla. March 3, 2011) at *2 n.2 (citing both the Senate 
transcript and General Fried’s written testimony).  Thus, according to the 
Individual Mandate’s own advocates, health care is no more “unique” a 
market than the fresh produce section of the local grocery store.   
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As the court below explained, “the contention that Commerce Clause 
power should be upheld merely because the government and its experts or 
scholars claim that it is being exercised to address a ‘particularly acute’ 
problem that is ‘singular[ ],’ ‘special,’ and ‘rare’ – that is to say ‘unique’ – 
will not by itself win the day. Uniqueness is not an adequate limiting 
principle as every market problem is, at some level and in some respects, 
unique.  If Congress asserts power that exceeds its enumerated powers, then 
it is unconstitutional, regardless of the purported uniqueness of the context 
in which it is being asserted.” Florida v. Department of HHS, 2011 WL 
285683 at *25.   
In short, market disruptions, inefficiencies, and cost-shifting are not 
unique to the health care and health insurance markets, and the Government 
provides no constitutional principle that would restrain Congress from 
addressing problems in other markets with its newly claimed power to 
compel individuals to enter the stream of commerce and buy products that 
they do not want.  Long before this litigation arose, Congress’ own non-
partisan Congressional Budget Office gave credence to an outlook very 
different from the brisk, rosy assurances offered by the Government here.   
When the CBO reviewed the first bill contemplating an individual mandate 
17 years ago and concluded that such a measure was unprecedented, the 
 21
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/13/2011     Page: 27 of 40
CBO observed that federal budgets have always distinguished between 
“resource allocation decisions that involve private choice, are made in a 
decentralized fashion, and are subject to the economic disciplines of the 
marketplace, and resource allocation decisions that are made in a centralized 
fashion at the federal level by the President and the Congress through the 
governmental budget process.” CBO MEMORANDUM at 4 (quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  The CBO reasoned that “the essence of private choice 
is the ability not to act.  Decisions about resource allocation are not private 
unless individuals can choose not to spend their money in response to 
market forces.” Id. at 7 (emphasis in original).   
Congress’ budget experts had to confront these issues because 
enactment of a mandate would have required a decision about how the 
mandate should be treated for federal budget purposes.  Given the degree of 
control that the federal government would exert over mandated purchases of 
health insurance by individuals who had been conscripted into commerce by 
congressional decree, the CBO was concerned that the cost to individuals of 
complying with the mandate ought to be counted as part of the federal 
budget.  Id. at 6-7.  The CBO then offered this warning:  
Failure to record the cost of this compulsory activity in the 
budget would open the door to a mandate-issuing government 
taking control of virtually any resource allocation decision that 
would otherwise be left to the private sector, without the federal 
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budget recording any increase in the size of government.  In the 
extreme, a command economy, in which the President and the 
Congress dictated how much each individual and family spent 
on all goods and services, could be instituted without any 
change in total federal receipts or outlays. 
CBO MEMORANDUM at 9.   
V. A STATUTE IS NOT “PROPER” UNDER THE NECESSARY 
AND PROPER CLAUSE IF IT WOULD NEGATE THE 
PURPOSE, EMBODIED IN ARTICLE I AND THE NINTH AND 
TENTH AMENDMENTS, OF ENUMERATING, AND 
THEREBY LIMITING, FEDERAL POWER.  
 
The Government’s argument that the Individual Mandate is essential 
to its larger regulatory scheme for the interstate health-care market, Govt. 
Brief 28-31, even if credited, goes only to the “Necessary” element of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.3  Even a “necessary” exercise of Commerce 
Clause authority must also be “a ‘Law …  proper for carrying into 
Execution the Commerce Clause.’ ”  Printz, 521 U.S. at 923-24, 117 S. Ct. 
at 2379 (quoting Art. I, § 8, cl. 18) (emphasis added by the Court).  In Chief 
Justice Marshall’s words, for a law to be “proper,” it must “consist with the 
letter and spirit of the Constitution.”  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 
                                              
3 The “necessity” identified by the Government, at bottom, is the need 
for additional monetary resources.  But the Internal Revenue Code is a 
testament to the innumerable ways in which revenues can be raised in accord 
with the Constitution, and thus a justification based on a need for additional 
resources is one of the least compelling showings of “necessity” imaginable.  
If Congress needs more money to pay for its health-care reforms, it has 
plenty of constitutional options available to it. 
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421 (1819).  The Individual Mandate fails this test because it is inconsistent 
with – indeed, it negates – the “first principle[]” that Article I “creates a 
Federal Government of enumerated powers” that are “‘few and defined.’”  
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552, 115 S. Ct. at 1626 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 
45).  Under the Government’s theory, Congress can impress unwilling 
individuals into commerce and compel them to buy unwanted products 
whenever doing so is deemed by Congress to be essential to some larger 
regulatory plan.4   
That makes this case actually easier to decide than Lopez, where the 
Court balked at the degree of attenuation between the regulated “actors” and 
the ultimate effect of “their conduct” on commerce.  514 U.S. at 580, 115 S. 
Ct. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 559-61, 565-67, 115 S. 
Ct. at 1630-31, 1632-34 (opinion of the Court).  Although the Court 
admitted that “some of our prior cases have taken long steps down [the] 
road” toward granting Congress a general police power by “giving great 
deference to congressional” programs regulating activities with remote 
effects on commerce, id. at 567, 115 S. Ct. at 1634, the Court drew the line 
at “a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or 
                                              
4 When the British navy impressed Americans into service in 1812, 
President James Madison deemed it casus belli.   
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any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those 
terms.”  Id. at 561, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31. “If some type of already-existing 
activity or undertaking were not considered to be a prerequisite to the 
exercise of commerce power, we would go beyond the concern articulated in 
Lopez for it would be virtually impossible to posit anything that Congress 
would be without power to regulate.” Florida v. Department of HHS, 2011 
WL 285683 at *22 (original emphasis). 
Thus the Individual Mandate strains the concept of commerce even 
more than the gun possession statute in Lopez, for it reflects not a difference 
in degree from prior exercises of Commerce Clause power, but a difference 
in kind.  The Individual Mandate reaches beyond economic “actors” to 
command even those who have decided not to act.  And, again, ordering 
unwilling individuals into the marketplace to buy unwanted products goes 
where even Congress has heretofore never ventured.  Far from what Chief 
Justice Marshall described as “the natural, direct, and appropriate means, or 
the known and usual means, for the execution of a given power,” JOHN 
MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 186 (Gerald Gunther 
ed. 1969) (emphasis added), the Individual Mandate is the ultimate form of 
congressional bootstrapping:  unwilling individuals are first coerced into the 
health insurance market and then their involuntary participation in that 
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market is used to justify the mandate as an exercise of the Commerce 
Clause.5  This is, in Alexander Hamilton’s phrase, “merely [an] act[] of 
usurpation” which “deserve[s] to be treated as such.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 
33, at 204 (A. Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (quoted in Printz, 521 
U.S. at 924, 117 S. Ct. at 2379).  And because this usurpation of general 
police power leaves no apparent “activity that the States may regulate but 
Congress may not,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564, 115 S. Ct. at 1632, the 
Individual Mandate encroaches on the reserved sovereign powers of the 
States in violation of the Tenth Amendment.   
But that is not all.  To uphold the claim of congressional power 
underlying the Individual Mandate would also fundamentally alter the very 
nature of the relationship between the federal government and the governed.  
That relationship is defined, in large part, by the limitations on federal 
regulation inherent in the Constitution’s enumeration of congressional 
                                              
5 Indeed, Congress’ own staff warned that the Individual Mandate 
may exceed its powers, noting that it may “be questioned whether a 
requirement to purchase health insurance is really a regulation of an 
economic activity or enterprise, if individuals who would be required to 
purchase health insurance are not, but for this regulation, a part of the health 
insurance market.” CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Requiring 
Individuals to Obtain Health Insurance: A Constitutional Analysis 6 (July 
24, 2009) (emphasis added). See Florida v. Dep’t of HHS, 2011 WL 285683 
at *23 (discussing CRS analysis at length). 
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powers.  Central to the Framers’ concept of republican government was the 
belief that the enumerated powers of the federal government are reciprocally 
related to the retained rights of the people.  By delegating certain legislative 
powers to the national government, the people consented to abide by the 
laws enacted by the federal government pursuant to those powers.  But as to 
those matters over which the national government had no enumerated power, 
the people had a retained right to do as they pleased, free of federal 
regulation.  See Charles Cooper, Limited Government and Individual 
Liberty: The Ninth Amendment’s Forgotten Lessons, 4 J. OF L. & POLITICS 
63, 64 (1987).  Indeed, many of the Framers opposed the incorporation of a 
Bill of Rights in the Constitution for fear that an attempt to “enumerate” the 
rights of the people would carry the risk that any omission from the list 
would be construed to grant Congress an implied, unenumerated power to 
legislate on the subject at issue.  Id. at 69-70.6  The Framers’ shield against 
this danger was the Ninth Amendment’s guaranty that “[t]he enumeration in 
                                              
6 This concern was succinctly expressed by James Wilson in the 
Pennsylvania ratifying convention:  “If we attempt an enumeration [of 
rights], every thing that is not enumerated is presumed to be given.  The 
consequence is, that an imperfect enumeration would throw all implied 
power into the scale of the government, and the rights of the people would 
be rendered incomplete.”  2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 436 (reprint 1966) (J. 
Elliot 2d ed. 1836) (statement of J. Wilson at Pennsylvania Ratifying 
Convention, Oct. 28, 1787). 
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the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.”       
In short, the limited and enumerated “powers granted” to the national 
government in Article I and the unlimited and unenumerated “rights 
retained” by the people in the Ninth Amendment are two sides of the same 
coin.  See THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 432 (G. Hunt. Ed. 1904) (letter 
to G. Washington dated Dec. 5, 1789).  The Framers conceived of the 
people’s reserved rights as ranging from the fundamental to the mundane, 
from the rights of free speech and assembly to an individual’s “right to wear 
his hat if he pleased.”7  There is little doubt that, somewhere along that 
continuum, the Framers would have placed the right of an individual to 
decide for herself which products and services she wishes to buy.8  After all, 
                                              
7 During the debates on the Bill of Rights, Congressman Sedgwick of 
Massachusetts objected that no amendment protecting free assembly was 
needed, for “it is a self-evident, unalienable right which the people possess 
… [and] that never would be called in question.”  He argued that, if 
Congress were going to “descend to such minutiae,” it may as well “have 
declared that a man should have a right to wear his hat if he pleased; that he 
might get up when he pleased, and go to bed when he thought proper; but [I] 
would ask the gentleman whether he thought it necessary to enter these 
trifles in a declaration of rights, in a Government where none of them were 
intended to be infringed.” 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 759-60 (J. Gales & W. 
Seaton ed. 1834). 
8 The right not to buy an unwanted product has an honored American 
pedigree.  The colonists in Boston boycotted tea and other products bearing 
the imprimatur of the Crown, and even King George III did not claim a 
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as the Government concedes, the event that triggers imposition of the 
Individual Mandate – and its penalties – is a decision not to act.  And even if 
the decision not to buy a product can fairly be characterized as an economic 
decision, the fact remains that the only regulated event is the naked decision 
itself – the mental process of thinking.  Indeed, in a recent decision 
upholding the Individual Mandate, one district court has chillingly opined 
that the distinction between mental and physical activity is “pure semantics,” 
and therefore Congress is free to regulate “mental activity” under the 
Commerce Clause.  Mead v. Holder, 2011 WL 611139 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 
2011) at *18.  See also Florida v. Department of HHS, 2011 WL 723117 at 
*2 n.1 (noting the Mead ruling with dismay).  The Government’s defense of 
the Individual Mandate thus rests on a twisted revision of Descartes’ 
syllogism:  “I think (about commerce), therefore I am (engaging in 
commerce).”  But the Constitution sounds in law, not metaphysics, and there 
                                                                                                                                      
sovereign power to compel his American subjects to buy English products.  
As the court below explained, “[i]t is difficult to imagine that a nation which 
began … as the result of opposition to a British mandate giving the East 
India Company a monopoly and imposing a nominal tax on all tea sold in 
America would have set out to create a government with the power to force 
people to buy tea in the first place.” Florida v. Dep’t of HHS, 2011 WL 
285683 at *22.  
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is no place in a federal government of limited and enumerated powers for 
this sort of Cartesian Commerce Clause.9   
CONCLUSION 
A federal law that conscripts state officials into participating in a 
federal regulatory regime enacted under the Commerce Clause infringes on 
the reserved state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment.  See 
Printz, 521 U.S. at 925, 928, 935, 117 S. Ct. at 2379-80, 2381, 2384.  The 
Individual Mandate goes farther, invading not only the State’s 
constitutionally protected sphere of sovereign autonomy, but the 
individual’s.  A nation that takes the first step along that path will find the 
second less difficult.  And that path leads ultimately to a place where the 
“central authority,” as Tocqueville warned, “monopolizes all activity and 
life,” where “there are subjects still, but no citizens.”  1 Alexis de 
Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 93-94 (Perennial Classics ed. 2000).  
If Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce is expanded to 
enable it to force individual citizens to buy products they do not want, then 
                                              
9 Certainly the monetary punishment imposed by the federal 
government for thinking about not buying health insurance is no mere 
philosophical exercise.  Although “governments need and have ample power 
to punish . . . acts,” it “does not follow that they must have a further power 
to punish thought . . . as distinguished from acts.”  Wieman v. Updegraff, 
344 U.S. 183, 193, 73 S. Ct. 215, 220 (1952) (Black, J., concurring).   
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little if anything will be left of the retained rights guaranteed by the Ninth 
Amendment, or of the distinction between a citizen and a subject.  
Accordingly, amicus curiae respectfully submits that the judgment of the 
court below should be affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
Brian S. Koukoutchos 
28 Eagle Trace 
Mandeville, LA 70471 
(985) 626-5052 
 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
/s/ Charles J. Cooper   
Charles J. Cooper 
Counsel of Record 
*Admitted to 11th Circuit Bar 
David H. Thompson 
COOPER & KIRK, PLLC 
1523 New Hampshire Ave., N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 220-9600 
(202) 220-9601 Fax 
 
Attorneys for Revere America Foundation 
 
 
 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/13/2011     Page: 37 of 40
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
 
 Pursuant to Rule 32(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, I 
hereby certify that the textual portion of the foregoing brief (exclusive of the 
disclosure statement, tables of contents and authorities, certificates of service 
and compliance, but including footnotes) contains 6,976 words as 
determined by the word-counting feature of Microsoft Word 2003 in 14-
point Times New Roman. 
 
 
        /s/ David. H. Thompson  
May 11, 2011      David H. Thompson 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/13/2011     Page: 38 of 40
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I hereby certify that on May 11, 2011, by Federal Express next business day  
delivery, the original plus six true and correct copies of the foregoing amicus 
curiae brief were caused to be sent to the following:   
 
Clerk of Court 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
56 Forsyth Street, N.W.  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303,  
 
I also hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing amicus 
curiae brief was caused to be sent by First Class U.S. mail to each of the 
following counsel of record for the parties:   
 
Blaine H. Winship 
Scott Douglas Makar 
Timothy David Osterhaus 
Joseph W. Jacquot 
Office of the Attorney General, 
Florida 
The Capitol, Suite PL-01 
400 South Monroe Street 
Tallahassee, FL 32399 
 
David Boris Rivkin, Jr. 
Lee Alfred Casey 
Andrew Grossman 
Baker & Hostetler LLP 
1050 Connecticut Ave. NW, Suite 
1100 
Washington, DC 20036 
 
Eric B. Beckenhauer 
Brian G. Kennedy  
U.S. Department of Justice 
20 Massachusetts Ave. NW  
Washington, DC 20530 
 
 
Katherine Jean Spohn 
Office of the Attorney General, 
Nebraska 
2115 State Capitol 
Lincoln, NE 68509 
 
Michael A. Carvin 
Gregory Katsas 
C. Kevin Marshall 
Hashim M. Mooppan 
Jones Day 
51 Louisiana Ave. NW 
Washington, DC 20001-2105 
 
Neal Kumar Katyal 
Thomas M. Bondy 
Alisa B. Klein 
Mark B. Stern 
Dana Kaersvang 
Samantha L. Chaifetz 
U.S. Department of Justice 
950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW  
Washington, DC  20530 
 
 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/13/2011     Page: 39 of 40
Paul D. Clement  
Bancroft PLLC 
1919 M Street NW, Suite 470  
Washington, DC 20036 
 
William James Cobb III 
Office of the Attorney General, Texas 
209 W. 14th Street 
Austin, TX 78711 
 
       /s/ Megan Smith   
       Megan Smith 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/13/2011     Page: 40 of 40
